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From a public policy standpoint, our overriding question becomes, where do we draw the
regulatory line? In this Essay, I will address some of the legislative challenges we face as organized
crime and international drug cartels continue to gain a foothold on our financial system.
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LAUNDERING
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INTRODUCTION
Of the many public policy challenges facing the lawmaking
and the law enforcement communities today, none represents as
significant a threat to the stability of our financial system as
money laundering does. The wholesale "cleansing" of dirty prof-
its derived from criminal activities reaches staggering propor-
tions - by some estimates, between US$100 and US$300 billion
in the United States,1 and nearly US$500 billion worldwide.2 As
a representative of the Congressional district encompassing San
Antonio, Texas, near the Southwest border's drug trafficking
corridor, and as former Chairman of the House Banking Com-
mittee, the Congressional panel with jurisdiction over laws gov-
erning money laundering, I have devoted much time and effort
to tackling the pernicious problem of financial crimes. Whether
through amending existing statutes or enacting new ones, Con-
gress has, over time, empowered regulators and the law enforce-
ment community with powerful legal tools, and has required fi-
nancial institutions to police themselves and their customers.
The ever-burgeoning illegal profits reaped by organized crime
groups, however, provide their launderers with a powerful incen-
tive to find new, creative ways of evading money laundering laws.
Very often the launderers succeed.
As legislators we face the responsibility of updating and en-
acting effective laws to catch up to a class of fast-moving, re-
sourceful, and adaptable money launderers. Our efforts entail a
tricky balancing act between the preservation of unrestrained le-
gitimate trade and the often intrusive, if necessary, needs of fi-
* Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S.
House of Representatives
1. U.S. General Accounting Office, Money Laundering: A Framework for Understand-
ing US. Efforts Overseas, GAO/GGD-96-105, May 24, 1996.
2. Hearings Before the Comm. On Banking and Financial Services, 105 Cong., 2d Sess.
112 (1996) (statement of Edward W. Kelley, Jr., Member, Bd. of Govs. of the Federal
Reserve).
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nancial regulators and law enforcement. From a public policy
standpoint, our overriding question becomes, where do we draw
the regulatory line? In this Essay, I will address some of the legis-
lative challenges we face as organized crime and international
drug cartels continue to gain a foothold on our financial system.
I. MONEY LA UNDER1NG: THE DRUG CONNECTION
Estimates of the money laundered through the Western
banking system by drug traffickers operating in the United States
and Europe range between US$100 and US$300 billion annu-
ally.3 In Mexico alone, the drug trade is valued at US$30 billion
per year, nearly five times the amount attributed to the Cali car-
tel at its height.4 Much of this trade occurs along the U.S.-Mexi-
can border, where four powerful drug cartels smuggle over sev-
enty percent of the narcotics entering the United States.5 There
are indications that the cartels launder much of these drug prof-
its through legitimate banking institutions and a variety of
money services businesses, such as check-cashing outlets, money
remitters, and currency exchangers, along the U.S.-Mexican bor-
der; indeed, the use of these types of non-banking "laundries"
appears widespread.6
While criminals of all stripes need to conceal the sources of
their illicit money, the massive scale of the drug trade and the
threat it poses to our financial system, elevates drug traffickers to
a class of their own in the universe of criminals. Organized drug
cartels employ sophisticated laundering techniques developed,
in some cases, by Ivy League-educated financial wizards. While
the cost of doing business for drug traffickers is high by the stan-
3. Id. In comparison, the nearly 8000 insured commercial banks in the United
States have a combined capital base of US$350 billion. Id. at 111.
4. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NAFTA: IMPLICATIONS FOR ILLICIT DRUG SUP-
PLY TO THE UNITED STATES 2 (1993).
5. US. Law Enforcement Response to Money Laundering Activities in Mexico: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. On General Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1996) (statement of Donnie Marshall,
Chief of Domestic Operations for the DEA).
6. Money service businesses are included in the statutory definition of non-bank
"financial institutions" that appears in 31 U.S.C. § 5312. 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (1982). The
term also applies, however, to insurance companies, broker-dealers, gaming businesses,
and other financial services providers. Throughout this Essay, I will use the more con-
ventional term "money services businesses," instead of the broader statutory term "non-
bank financial institutions," to refer to check cashers, currency exchangers, and money
transmitters.
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dards of a legitimate business, estimates range between twenty
to thirty-five percent of total profits, the sheer volume and vast
profitability of their illegal enterprise ultimately dwarfs the im-
pact of that cost on their bottom line. For instance, a thirty-five
percent loss through seizures, production costs, bribes, and
transportation on US$200 billion worth of drug business still
leaves drug traffickers with US$130 billion in profits. I often
wonder how traffickers manage to launder such enormous
amounts of cash. A sobering reminder, however, is the tale of
the US$40 million in cash belonging to a Colombian drug king-
pin that rotted in a California basement because his launderers
could not fit it in their overloaded laundry machines.7 Clearly,
for drug trafficking organizations that successfully launder bil-
lions of dollars even a US$40 million loss is well within accepta-
ble bounds. What other business in the world could absorb such
losses?
II. MONEY LA UNDERING LAWS AND THEIR IMPACT
In the face of daunting challenges, Congress has enacted
money laundering legislation to make it more difficult for drug
traffickers and other criminals to abuse our financial institu-
tions. In general, U.S. money laundering laws are grounded on
the theory that most crime is profit-driven and that "following
the money" ultimately leads to the predicate offense from which
illegal profits are derived. As such, our laws mandate several re-
porting and recordkeeping requirements for routine currency
transactions over US$10,000, suspicious transactions over
US$5,000, and for other transactions covering a range of mone-
tary instruments in order to create a paper trail that may be use-
ful for law enforcement purposes.
Thus, while the Bank Secrecy Act of 19708 ("BSA"), as
amended, sets out these reporting requirements and the crimi-
nal and civil penalties for failure to comply, the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 19869 makes it a crime to launder money as part of an-
7. JEFFERY ROBINSON, THE LAUNDRYMEN: INSIDE MONEY LAUNDERING, THE WORLD'S
THIRD-LARGEST BUSINESS 218 (1996).
8. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1118 (1970) (codified as 12
U.S.C. § 1829b, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 et seq. (1994)). Regula-
tions implementing Title II of the Bank Secrecy Act (i.e., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 et seq.)
appear at 31 CFR § 103.
9. Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
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other criminal act 10 or by structuring transactions to evade re-
porting requirements." The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laun-
dering Act of 199212 strengthened regulators' powers to revoke
charters of federally insured depository institutions convicted of
money laundering or cash transaction reporting offenses, and
also imposed tighter controls over the activities of money serv-
ices businesses, a less regulated and more attractive vehicle for
money launderers.
In crafting anti-money laundering legislation, I have sought
to balance regulatory prudence with unencumbered trade, keep-
ing in mind the overwhelming need to erect as many obstacles as
possible against money launderers. With these objectives in
mind, the 1994 Money Laundering Suppression Act"3 (the "1994
Act") represents Congress' latest effort to combat money laun-
dering. The 1994 Act resulted from a Banking Committee inves-
tigation I began as far back as 1989, which continues to this day.
My investigation revealed that Federal anti-money laundering ac-
tivities were geared towards simply detecting, but not necessarily
prosecuting, money laundering. For example, under the BSA,
financial institutions are required to file with the Internal Reve-
nue Service ("IRS") currency transaction reports ("CTRs") for
each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency, or other pay-
ment or transfer of more than US$10,000.1 4 By late-1993, finan-
cial institutions had filed over fifty million CTRs at significant
expense to them as well as to the Federal Government. By 1997,
CTR filings had doubled. In testimony before the Banking Com-
mittee, law enforcement and the banking community ques-
tioned the usefulness of so many CTRs. They argued that the
emphasis on compliance with costly and cumbersome reporting
requirements worked against the effective enforcement of
money laundering laws. Vast numbers of reports were filed on
clearly legitimate transactions but law enforcement agencies
could not process them, much less target investigations. We con-
cluded that a streamlined, more targeted reporting system would
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1994). Violations are punishable by a maximum of 20
years in prison and/or US$500,000 in fines, plus forfeiture. Id.
11. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994).
12. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat.
4044.
13. Money Laundering Supression Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2243.
14. 31 U.S.C. §5326(a) (1994); 31 C.F.R. 103.26 (1989).
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be more cost-effective and would better serve the BSA's intent of
documenting transactions that have a "high degree of usefulness
in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings."' 5
The 1994 Act represented Congress' effort to redress some
of these shortcomings. The 1994 Act streamlined the currency
transaction reporting process by creating a two-tiered reporting
system: (1) a mandatory exemption from reporting require-
ments for transactions by banks with other banks, and state and
federal entities;16 and (2) a discretionary provision allowing
banks to exempt their best known customers on the basis of cri-
teria set by the Department of the Treasury. 7 Allowing deposi-
tory institutions to exempt certain customers from reporting re-
quirements made it even more critical for banks to know their
customers and to report suspicious transactions to law enforce-
ment officials. To simplify and encourage compliance, the 1994
Act consolidated suspicious activity reporting to one single form
filed with the IRS, as opposed to several law enforcement agen-
cies, as previously required.' 8 The 1994 Act also closed a loop-
hole in existing law to make foreign bank drafts a reportable
monetary instrument. 19 Law enforcement agencies estimate that
over US$10 billion was laundered annually through bank drafts
purchased in Mexico and subsequently cashed in U.S. banks.
The Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes En-
forcement Network ("FinCEN"), the regulatory agency responsi-
ble for administering the BSA, has made some progress in final-
izing regulations to fully implement the 1994 Act. So far,
FinCEN has issued final rules on suspicious transaction report-
ing requirements for banks, a single designee for reporting of
suspicious transactions, and a redesigned CTR form. In the
spring of 1996, FinCEN issued interim rules which become effec-
tive upon issuance, but still require a ninety-day public comment
15. 31 U.S.C. §5311 (1992); 31 C.F.R. 103.20.
16. §402, 108 Stat. at 2243.
17. Id.
18. See 31 U.S.C. §5313(a) (1994).
19. A bank draft is a monetary instrument in nonbearer form drawn by a bank
operating outside the United States on the bank's account at a financial institution in
the United States. The 1994 Act expanded the definition of a monetary instrument to
include bank drafts, which must be reported to U.S. Customs by persons transporting
more than US$10,000 in or out of the United States. Upon approval through the
rulemaking process, the new definition of "monetary instrument" will appear in 31
C.F.R. 103.11(u) (1996).
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period. The rules went beyond the congressional mandate for
CTR exemptions and exempted routine transactions by public
companies listed on the New York and American Stock Ex-
changes and in the NASDAQ National Market.20 These rules are
now final.
Other proposed rules, such as those for foreign bank drafts,
have gone through an extensive public comment period and are
expected to be finalized by the end of 1997, provided that sev-
eral technical issues raised by the industries affected are re-
solved. Other rules that apply to money services businesses, how-
ever, such as the one requiring national registration of money
transmitting businesses, which was to be issued no later than 180
days after the enactment of the 1994 Act, were issued for public
comment only recently. In response to recent abuses in the in-
dustry, FinCEN also proposed a rule requiring money transmit-
ters, and issuers and sellers of money orders and traveler's
checks to report any and all suspicious transactions above
US$500. A third rule would lower the reporting requirement
threshold from US$10,000 to US$750 for all cash remittances by
money transmitters to or from any place outside of the United
States. All three proposed rules are expected to become final at
the end of 1997.
While changes to U.S. laws were intended to move us closer
to prosecuting money laundering, a recent federal civil trial in
Houston raised many questions about efforts to enforce them.21
The trial involved the Federal Government's claim that US$9
million confiscated from a Houston bank account belonging to
the former Deputy Attorney General of Mexico, Mario Ruiz Mas-
sieu, came from illegal narcotics proceeds.2 While the jury
ruled that the U.S. Government can retain US$7.9 of the US$9
million, we learned from the trial that an aide to Mr. Ruiz Mas-
sieu made a series of twenty-four cash deposits, mostly in twenty-
dollar bills, for more than US$200,000 each. 3 While Texas
20. 31 U.S.C. 5313(d), (f), (g); 31 C.F.R. 103.22(h) (1996).
21. See Massieu v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681, 687 (D.NJ. 1996) (citing United States
v. Nine Million Forty One Thousand, Five Hundred Ninety Eight Dollars and Sixty
Eight Cents, No. H-95-3182).
22. See id. at 687-88 (referring to Government's charges against Mr. Massieu con-
cerning US$9 million, allegedly obtained illegally).
23. See id. at 687 (citing United States v. Nine Million Forty One Thousand, Five
Hundred Ninety Eight Dollars and Sixty Eight Cents, No. H-95-3182).
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Commerce Bank filed all the required forms and even marked
ten of the deposits as suspicious, and Mr. Massieu's aide also
filed required Customs forms when crossing the border, it ap-
pears that none of the federal law enforcement agencies acted
on the bank's tips. We are left wondering whether this signifi-
cant oversight represents the flaws of the old, cumbersome re-
porting system, lax vigilance by the banks of its customers, 4 or
plain incompetence on the part of law enforcement.
III. THE MONEY LAUNDERING M1LIEU
Despite the 1994 Act's success in reducing burdensome
paperwork requirements and in targeting Federal efforts toward
prosecution and not just detection of money laundering, the
next generation of laws will have to tackle a whole new set of
challenges. Based on my investigation, I see two major areas of
concern: (1) bulk currency movements from Mexican or other
foreign banks to U.S. banks; and (2) the use of money services
businesses as money laundering vehicles.
A. Bulk Currency Movements and Federal Reseme Banks' Cash
Surpluses: Money Laundering Red Flags?
We know from testimony by bank regulators and law en-
forcement officials that Mexico returns more surplus currency to
the United States than any other country in the world.25 For the
last several years, the San Antonio Branch of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas has consistently reported an annual currency sur-
plus in the US$3 billion range. 26 Similarly, the Los Angeles Fed-
eral Reserve reported a US$13 billion surplus of currency for
1995, which was a US$5 billion increase from 1994.27 Tradition-
ally, Miami has posted cash surpluses in the US$7 billion
range.28 Many in the law enforcement community believe that
24. Mr. Massieu opened the account with an expired diplomatic passport.
25. Remarks Before the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, 102nd Cong.,
sess. 3 (1996) (statement of Harold D. Wankel, Chief Executive Officer, Drug Enforce-
ment Agency).
26. A Federal Reserve branch has a surplus when currency deposits from its mem-
ber depository institutions exceed the Federal Reserve's currency shipments to these
same depository institutions.
27. See Net Currency Receipt Data from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
(1996) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
28. Id. at 3.
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these surpluses point to drug money being laundered through
financial institutions that deposit currency with the Federal Re-
serve. Others think that cash surpluses represent the repatria-
tion of money from Mexico and South America resulting from
the settling of accounts for transactions between U.S. banks and
corresponding financial institutions in those countries. If the
latter is true, however, why are the surpluses only in areas associ-
ated with drug trafficking corridors?
Since 1989, when I became Chairman of the Banking Com-
mittee, I have raised many questions about the origins and expla-
nations of these surpluses. Do they represent repatriated cash
from Mexico, or unusual movements of currency worthy of law
enforcement attention? Are they a product of legitimate busi-
ness and personal transactions? Given the prominence of the
drug trade along the U.S.-Mexican border, are the surpluses an
indication of cash laundered through financial institutions in
the area? If they represent indications of money laundering not
revealed by our existing reporting framework, does Congress
need to take legislative action? What can our law enforcement
agencies do with their existing authority? Full answers to these
questions, whether from bankers, law enforcement, or regula-
tors, have been hard to come by.
In an effort to determine whether we needed to take legisla-
tive action, I asked Federal agencies with anti-money laundering
jurisdiction to trace the origins of the Federal Reserve cash sur-
pluses. FinCEN provided insightful data showing that a handful
of depository institutions in the San Antonio area posted sub-
stantial cash surpluses with the Federal Reserve, a partial expla-
nation for the Federal Reserve's own cash surplus. FinCEN
claimed, however, that local specialized law enforcement units in
the area, particularly the IRS's Criminal Investigation Division
had more intimate knowledge of the local banking environment
and were better equipped to trace the nature of each depository
institution's cash transactions.
Subsequently, I requested the IRS's assistance. Could the
surpluses result from presumed legitimate unreported bank-to-
bank or preferred customer transactions? Were they, on the
other hand, a sign of other, questionable activity? The IRS
claimed not to have the legal authority to access the bank
records that would answer these questions. In fact, rather than
conducting a reasoned analysis of the available cash transaction
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data, the IRS relied on anecdotal speculations and unsubstanti-
ated opinions of bank officials. For instance, the IRS claimed,
without documented proof, that surpluses result from the cash-
intensive nature of the local economy, problems with the Fed-
eral Reserve's accounting system, and mergers and acquisitions
of local banking institutions in San Antonio, Texas. Assuming
that some of these answers intuitively make sense, even though
they are meaningless without hard evidence to support them, I
asked Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan for his
agency's views. The Federal Reserve refuted virtually every IRS
assertion, arguing that accounting problems have nothing to do
with Federal Reserve cash surpluses, and that mergers and acqui-
sitions have had no appreciable impact on surpluses.
In the wake of these inconclusive responses, FinCEN investi-
gated the matter further. FinCEN's analysis, which has been dili-
gent and thorough, has revealed that Federal Reserve surpluses
are only the tip of the iceberg of a more complex, but revealing,
puzzle of cash transactions. For the top banks showing the larg-
est daily cash flows, it appears that nearly half of the currency
entering their vaults, representing tens of billions of dollars, has
origins in Mexican financial institutions. Thus, while the Fed-
eral Reserve's cash surpluses may only be an indicator of mass
currency movements in a particular area, what is at issue are the
transactions underlying individual banks' cash surpluses.29
While FinCEN's analysis showed that compliance with the
reporting system is high, (CTRs are routinely filed), the flow of
cash from Mexico raises some very serious public policy ques-
tions. How confident are we of the legitimacy of bulk cash ship-
ments coming to U.S. financial institutions from other coun-
tries? How do we determine whether those bulk cash shipments
to U.S. banks, particularly from Mexican banks, are the final
point in the laundering cycle? What are the implications of mass
currency movements from Mexico for Treasury's enforcement of
financial crimes, regardless of whether they occur in an area
where the Federal Reserve registers a cash surplus? If indeed
wholesale money laundering occurs through this method, what
legislative remedies are available to address the problem?
29. Review of a Treasuy Department Study of Cash Surpluses at the San Antonio Branch of
the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank: Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking and Financial Services,
105th Cong., 1st Sess. 105-16 (1997).
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Some of these questions can only be answered from infor-
mation available to other countries' banking authorities. For ex-
ample, as part of its general strategy to fight drug trafficking and
money laundering, the Mexican government recently reformed
its penal code to criminalize money laundering.3" This change
mandates the development of a currency transaction reporting
system similar to the one in place in the United States. It will
also require financial institutions to routinely report currency
transactions above US$10,000, as well as suspicious transac-
tions.31 To the extent that our respective law enforcement com-
munities agree to share information in joint anti-money launder-
ing operations, we will make great strides in addressing the prob-
lem. I am hopeful that Mexico's new undertaking, coupled with
the strengthening of U.S. laws, will help us answer some of the
outstanding questions about mass cash movements between
Mexican and U.S. financial institutions. Our cooperation on
this front is crucial in light of the State Department's recent
characterization of Mexico as "a major money laundering center
and the preferred international placement point for U.S. dol-
lars." 2
B. The Vulnerability of Money Services Businesses to
Money Laundering
Niccolo Machiavelli once wrote, "men are so simple and so
ready to obey present necessities, that one who deceives will al-
ways find those who allow themselves to be deceived."3 3
Although characterizing modern drug kingpins as Machiavel-
lian truly underestimates their power and ruthlessness, their
enormous capacity for deception is what makes them such effec-
tive money launderers. Many money services businesses, in their
readiness to obey present necessities, have become unwitting vic-
tims, and often willing participants, in money laundering
schemes.
We know that U.S. banks today are much less vulnerable to
30. U.S. Dept. Of State, Bur. For Int'l Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, In-
ternational Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Mar. 1997, at 570 [hereinafter Strategy
Report].
31. Leslie Crawford, Mexico Acts on Cash Laundering, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10 1997, at
18.
32. Strategy Report, supra note 30, at 140.
33. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 122 (1948).
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money laundering abuses. We owe this to a more effective bank
examination process (an outgrowth of the savings-and-loan crisis
of the 1980s), better targeted money laundering laws, and a
good-faith effort on the part of banks to police themselves and
their customers. This is not so for many non-bank financial insti-
tutions. Money remitters, businesses that provide cash transmit-
ting services for a fee, primarily to recipients overseas, for in-
stance, operate with minimal Federal and State regulation. This
is also the case for currency exchange houses.
Consider the case of money remitters in Queens, New York.
A Treasury-led, multiagency law enforcement task force dubbed
"El Dorado" recently issued an emergency geographic targeting
order34 ("GTO") under the BSA aimed at twelve, later expanded
to twenty-two, licensed money remitting corporations in New
York suspected of drug cartel abuse because they funnelled
nearly US$1.3 billion to Colombia.3 5 The GTO imposes report-
ing requirements for all transactions exceeding US$750, instead
of the usual US$10,000.36 As such, the order protects the aver-
age legitimate remittance of between US$200 and US$500 but
imposes a significant reporting burden on launderers that at-
tempt to structure their transactions above the temporary
US$750 threshold.
The effects of the order have been dramatic. 37 Overall busi-
ness volume by money remitters sending funds to Colombia
dropped more than thirty-five percent. Drug cartels immedi-
ately shifted to alternative laundering methods, mainly bulk cash
smuggling at ports of entry. From August 1996, the time the
GTO was issued, to March 1997, law enforcement seized US$50
million in various points along the eastern seaboard (mostly at
34. Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §5326 (a) and 31 C.F.R. 103.26 (1989), the Secretary of
the Treasury is authorized, if reasonable grounds exist, to issue a 60-day order (renewa-
ble, if needed) imposing additional reporting and recordkeeping requirements on one
or more domestic financial institutions in a specified geographic area. The geographic
targeting order ("GTO") is administered by FinCEN and is temporary to prevent inter-
ference with legitimate trade.
35. Robert D. McFadden, Limits on Cash Transactions Cut DrugMoney Laundering,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 11, 1997, at Al.
36. Id. at Al.
37. Unless authorized by the Treasury Secretary, disclosure of the order is prohib-
ited to prevent interference with law enforcement operations as well as court chal-
lenges, as occurred with the second order issued in Houston, Texas. See 31 U.S.C.
§5326 as amended by Annunzio-Wiley Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-550, § 1514, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992).
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the LaGuardia, JFK, and Miami airports); four times the amount
seized during the same period in 1995.38 At the same time, of
the twelve original targeted remitters, three have stopped remit-
ting funds to Colombia. The remaining nine are sending
amounts significantly lower than those sent prior to the GTO.
The order also led to several high profile Federal prosecutions
under money laundering statutes.
In my home state of Texas, many casas de cambio, or cur-
rency exchangers, and casas de giros, or money wire remitters,
long suspected of money laundering, have shut down over the
years because of stepped up Federal and State efforts to monitor
their activities. The Banking Committee hearings I chaired in
1989 and 1993 brought attention to the operations of these
money services businesses unique to the economy of the South-
west. We learned that the virtual unregulated operation of giro
houses allowed drug traffickers to wire billions of illicit drug
profits to Colombia. The Treasury Department imposed a GTO
for the Houston, Texas area in 1991 and its effects were the same
as those repeated in the Queens, New York area in 1996-97. Re-
mittances to Colombia diminished significantly as did the
number of businesses offering money transmitting and currency
exchange services. At the same time, the Texas Legislature en-
acted several laws whose licensing and reporting requirements
continued to drive the illegal operations out of the market.
These recent law enforcement successes make clear that a
large segment of the non-bank financial industry is vulnerable to
money laundering. So far, twenty-three States have adopted a
variety of licensing and registration requirements applicable to
their money services businesses, but the remaining States have
yet to adopt strong money laundering statutes. I continue to
monitor the 1994 Act's mandate on the Treasury Department to
register money services businesses nationally, as well as progress
in developing a uniform model statute for all States to license
and regulate money transmitting businesses. If the Texas experi-
ence teaches us a lesson, it is that strong State oversight of a
vulnerable financial segment can go a long way in interrupting
and shutting down a money laundering pipeline. Continued vig-
38. The New York Money Transmitter Geographic Targeting Order: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On General Oversight and Investigations, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1997) (state-
ment by Raymond W. Kelly, Under Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
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ilance is warranted in light of the thriving drug trade along the
Southwest border and mounting evidence that currency smug-
gling is alive and well.
C. Our Future Challenges
According to the Director of FinCEN, Stanley Morris, the
world's currency markets trade about US$1.25 trillion daily, a
six-fold increase from 1986, and 100 times the volume of world
trade.39 In such a vast money market, the opportunities for
money launderers are endless. Given its limited financial and
legal resources, law enforcement's ability to stay afloat in this
bottomless sea of cash transactions is also limited. But this chal-
lenge cannot stop us from using the power to enact effective laws
to stop money launderers.
As we learn more about the flow of currency across interna-
tional boundaries we must tailor our laws and encourage other
countries to do so, as well to address the many loopholes ex-
ploited by money launderers. In its global assessment of interna-
tional money laundering, the State Department's March 1997 In-
ternational Narcotics Control Report repeats a number of long-stand-
ing problems that complicate our ability to accomplish this
including the increased infiltration of financial systems around
the world by organized crime and the increased use of cash
smuggling routes through countries with few or no money laun-
dering laws.4" We have achieved a great deal of cooperation
among the twenty-six nations that are members of the Financial
Action Task Force, but we have yet to exploit that cooperation to
bring on board those nations whose financial systems are easily
manipulated by organized crime groups. In the end, the success
of our fight can only be measured by the extent to which we
dismantle the powerful criminal organizations that threaten our
financial system.
We have seen some positive results from the effective, do-
mestic enforcement of our laws. Both the New York and South-
west border experiences have raised our awareness of the dan-
gers of allowing a vulnerable money services industry to go un-
regulated, as well as the benefits of a coordinated anti-money
39. Hearing Before Comm. On Banking and Financial Sewices, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1996) (statement of Stanley E. Morris, Dir., FinCEN).
40. Strategy Report, supra note 30, at 571.
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laundering strategy through strong State and Federal regulation.
The uncoordinated effort of many agencies in the fight against
money laundering, however, has slowed the Federal Govern-
ment's ability to enforce our laws. A recent report I commis-
sioned by the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm
of Congress, found that the plethora of agencies involved in
money laundering activities makes it difficult for foreign authori-
ties to coordinate with U.S. law enforcement.4 1 I am considering
introducing legislation to create a "money laundering czar" by
giving the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Pol-
icy, the "drug czar," additional statutory authority to carry out
this duty. "I am hopeful that the Banking Committee in the
105th Congress will give adequate consideration to this and
other legislative fixes to address the most pernicious problem of
financial crimes, of which money laundering is a significant part.
41. Money Laundering: A Framework for Understanding U.S. Efforts Overseas, supra note
1, at 3.
